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TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY: IS THE
ALCOHOLIC INCAPACITATED?
Sharon Glisson Bradley
The only Montana statutory requirements regarding capacity
to make a will are that the testator be eighteen years of age and of
sound mind.1 This note addresses the effect of alcohol use upon
mental competency and thereby testamentary capacity.
There is no precise standard for determining whether a testa-
tor has the mental capacity to execute a will. Rather, the courts
have developed the following general elements to consider when
determining capacity: (1) general knowledge of the kind and quan-
tity of property owned; (2) awareness of the document being exe-
cuted and its effect; (3) knowledge of planned disposition; and (4)
knowledge and appreciation of the natural objects of the testator's
bounty.2 A testator must meet each requirement and be able to
understand those requirements as they relate to each other.3
There is a general presumption that the testator of a properly
executed and attested will4 was mentally competent.5 Some juris-
dictions place the burden on the proponent of a will to prove testa-
mentary capacity,' but Montana has placed the burden of proving
lack of testamentary capacity on the contestant.7 An interested
person s who wishes to contest a will can do so for several reasons.
Pertinent to this note are challenges to the validity of a will be-
cause of a lack of testamentary capacity due to the habitual or
chronic use of alcohol.
Because intoxication is a temporary condition, a party con-
1. MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-301 (1983).
2. Note, Testamentary Capacity, 3 LAW & PSYCH. REV. 107-08 (1977). See also In re
Cissel's Estate, 104 Mont. 306, 314, 66 P.2d 779, 782 (1937); In re Bielenberg's Estate, 85
Mont. 521, 528, 284 P. 546, 548 (1930).
3. 11 Am. JUR. POF 162 (1961).
4. MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-302 (1983).
5. Blackmer v. Blackmer, 165 Mont. 69, 74, 525 P.2d 559, 562 (1974).
6. In re Estate of Nelson, 250 N.W.2d 286, 289 (S.D. 1977).
7. MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-3-310 (1983).
8. MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-1-103(21) (1983) provides:
"Interested person" includes heirs, devisees, children, spouses, creditors, benefi-
ciaries, and any others having a property right in or claim against a trust estate or
the estate of a decedent, ward, or protected person which may be affected by the
proceeding. It also includes persons having priority for appointment as personal
representative and other. fiduciaries representing interested persons. The meaning
as it relates to particular persons may vary from time to time and must be deter-
mined according to the particular purposes of and matter involved in any
proceeding.
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testing a will must present evidence making it apparent that the
testator was so far under the influence of alcohol at the time of
execution that he lacked the fundamental elements of testamen-
tary capacity.9
An individual is incapacitated, for purposes of guardianship or
conservatorship proceedings, if by reason of "chronic intoxication"
he lacks sufficient understanding to make responsible decisions
concerning himself.'" As part of the Montana Uniform Probate
Code, such a definition likely would be helpful in determining
whether a testator suffered from testamentary incapacity by reason
of excessive alcohol use. Evidence of excessive or chronic alcohol
use generally is admissible on the issue of testamentary capacity. 1
Habitual intoxication, however, does not create a presumption of
incapacitating drunkenness at the time of executing a will. 2 There
must be a showing that, because of intoxication, the testator was
disabled at the time he executed his will with respect to one or
more of the elements of capacity.' 3 Even a chronic alcoholic is con-
sidered to have capacity, when sober, to make a will. 4 The contest-
ant challenging a will must show that, at the time of execution, the
testator was suffering from some mental disorder arising out of his
excessive use of alcohol, and that the disorder rendering him inca-
pable of performing one or more of those mental functions neces-
sary to make a will. 15
If a contestant presents sufficient evidence of the testator's al-
cohol-induced mental incapacity, which was manifested shortly
before and after the time of execution, such incapacity is presumed
to have existed when the will was executed.' 6 The proponent may
counter with evidence that the will was executed during a lucid
interval. 17
A lucid interval is a period of sanity or competence between
periods of insanity or incompetence. 18 Occurrence of a lucid inter-
9. Estate of Nelson, 250 N.W.2d at 289.
10. MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-5-101(1) (1983).
11. In re Cashion's Estate, 27 Cal. App. 2d 689, 691, 81 P.2d 628, 630 (1938). See also
79 Am. JUR. 2D Wills § 126 (1975).
12. McGrail v. Schmitt, 357 S.W.2d 111, 119 (Mo. 1962). See also 79 AM. JUR. 2D
Wills § 112 (1975).
13. 79 AM. JUR. 2D Wills § 114 (1975); Ravenscroft v. Stull, 280 Ill. 406, 411, 117 N.E.
602, 603 (1917). See also 11 Am. JUR. POF 206 (1961).
14. 11 AM. JUR. POF 207. See also 79 AM. JuR. Wills § 112 (1975).
15. Elkinton v. Brick, 44 N.J. Eq. 154, 15 A. 391 (1888).
16. 11 Am. JUR. POF 213 (1961). See Alexander v. Estate of Callahan, 132 So. 2d 42, 43
(Fla. 1961).
17. 79 Am. JUR. 2D Wills § 112 (1975).
18. See, e.g., In re Estate of Cook, 231 Or. 133, 136, 372 P.2d 520, 522 (1962).
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val raises a presumption that a mentally incompetent testator was
sufficiently uninfluenced by his disease that the legal consequences
of incompetency are inapplicable. 9 A will executed by even a
chronic alcoholic may be found valid if the proponent can present
sufficient evidence of execution during a lucid interval.2" Evidence
necessary to prove the lucid interval may be classified in terms of:
(1) the testator's conduct; (2) his organic condition; (3) the type of
disposition; and (4) opinions of others.2 An unnatural, unjust, or
unfair disposition is not determinative of incapacity22 but it would
be admissible as evidence of the testator's mental state.2" A dispo-
sition which is in conformity with the testator's previous declara-
tions may be cogent proof of capacity. On the other hand, a dispo-
sition in opposition to prior expressions, unless explained, may
supply additional evidence of incapacity.24
The opinions of nonexperts regarding mental competency
must be based on actual observation.25 The observations may have
been made shortly before or after execution of the will but need
not be made at the time of execution, as a witness is not required
to be present in order to give an opinion regarding general mental
competency.26
In determining testamentary capacity the court must examine
all surrounding circumstances,2 7 including the education and expe-
rience of the testator. Habitual alcohol use may lead to such condi-
tions as delirium, in which thinking and perception are disor-
dered. 28 Delirium can produce reactions ranging from mental
sluggishness to bewilderment and bafflement.2 9 Delirium reduces
the capacity for abstract thinking and impairs the ability to main-
tain concentration.3 0
In order to invalidate a will, it is necessary to prove that a
testator's use of alcohol or alcoholism rendered him incapable of
understanding the nature and consequences of his acts at the time
19. 18 AM. Jua. POF 2D § 1 (1979). See also 1 W. BOWE & D. PARKER, PAGE ON WILLS
§12.36 (1960).
20. Akers v. Morton, 499 F.2d 44, 46 (9th Cir. 1974).
21. Note, Testamentary Capacity in a Nutshell: A Psychiatric Reevaluation, 18 STAN.
L. REv. 1119 (1966).
22. In re Cissel's Estate, 104 Mont. at 315, 66 P.2d at 782.
23. Estate of Dillenburg, 136 Mont. 542, 547, 349 P.2d 573, 574 (1960).
24. Id. at 547, 349 P.2d at 575.
25. Ergang v. Anderson, 378 Ill. 312, 315-16, 38 N.E.2d 26, 28 (1941).
26. Dillenburg, 136 Mont. at 546, 349 P.2d at 575.
27. Dillman v. McDaniel, 222 Ill. 276, 290, 78 N.E. 591, 596 (1906).
28. 11 AM. JUR, POF 182.
29. 1d.
30. Id.
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he executed his will. Although courts rarely invalidate a will on the
basis of the testator's alcohol-induced testamentary incapacity, an
attorney drafting a will should be careful to ensure the alert
mental state of a client who drinks excessively or is an alcoholic.
An attorney drafting a will for a person suspected of being a heavy
alcohol user might consider one or more of the following safeguards
to assist in avoiding a challenge to the will based on alcohol-in-
duced testamentary incapacity: (1) tactfully asking the testator to
undergo a medical examination to aid in establishing testamentary
capacity; (2) arranging for a video tape to be made of the execution
of the will; (3) including in the will itself the reasons for excluding
any party or making any significant changes from previous wills;
and (4) having the execution witnessed by persons who know the
testator but who have no interest in the will.
The contestant's burden of proving alcohol-induced testamen-
tary incapacity is substantial, and rarely met. Nevertheless, ensur-
ing a testator's capacity at the time the will is executed could help
to avoid subsequent litigation which otherwise would unnecessarily
delay disposition of the estate.
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